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Mastering the Endgame of War
Dominic Tierney

In 1941, Japan weighed the merits of attacking the most powerful country in the world:
the United States. It was a war of choice and Tokyo had time to carefully consider the
decision. Japanese leaders debated the best date to strike Pearl Harbor. And they also
thought through the potential short-term effects. But Tokyo barely considered the military
endgame, or the final stages of a campaign where an armistice is agreed, hostilities cease,
and a new post-war order emerges.
Japan knew that the long-term prognosis for a war against the United States was
doubtful at best, given America’s vast advantage in resources. Still, Japanese officials
believed that early battlefield victories, the nation’s superior fighting spirit, and a
protracted war of attrition, could wear down the will of Americans and produce a
favorable peace. “We cannot exclude the possibility that the war may end because of a
great change in American public opinion…At any rate we should be able to establish an
invincible position…Meanwhile, we may hope that we will be able to influence the trend
of affairs and bring the war to an end.”i
The Kiyomizu Temple in Kyoto is a Buddhist shrine that juts out over a steep cliff
edge. Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki concluded: “There are times when we must
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have the courage to do extraordinary things—like jumping, with eyes closed, off the
veranda of the Kiyomizu Temple.”ii But without a clear plan for concluding the conflict,
Tokyo was leaping into the dark, and initiating a war that would end with its major cities
reduced to ashes.
Throughout history, statesmen have plunged countries into war without thinking
through the military endgame. When fighting looms, leaders often focus on the initial
rounds rather than the achievement of ultimate strategic success.iii The United States may
be particularly prone to neglect the conflict endgame. In recent years, U.S. officials have
failed to plan effectively for post-combat stabilization (or what is termed Phase IV of
war, following Phase I, deterrence and engagement; Phase II, initial operations to seize
the initiative; and Phase III, major combat operations).iv In 2001-2003, the United States
invaded Afghanistan and Iraq with little heed to the long-term consequences.
Preparing for the conclusion of war is a critical part of any sound strategy that
connects ends and means. Carl von Clausewitz advised against taking the first step in
war, “without considering the last.”v B.H. Liddell Hart wrote: “it is essential to conduct
war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”vi According to Henry Kissinger: “The
test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.”vii The failure to prepare for post-conflict
stabilization in Iraq led to the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and tens of
thousands of Iraqi civilians, and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars.
Why does Washington struggle to master the endgame of war? And can this
record be improved? Despite its importance, there is relatively little written about the
conclusion of war. Far more scholarship is devoted to how wars begin than how they
end.viii This paper argues that ineffective U.S. planning for military endgames results
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from the interaction between two variables: the psychological bias of overconfidence and
the American cultural bias against nation-building. The first variable is a positivity bias
where leaders exaggerate the odds of success in wartime. The second is a negativity bias
where Americans are averse to using the military for stabilization operations. The
synergy between these dynamics encourages the belief that extensive nation-building
operations will be both unnecessary and unwise.
One solution for these challenges is to reverse engineer victory. Instead of
planning ahead from Phase I through Phase IV, Washington should start at the end, by
identifying a final state that represents strategic success, and then work backward from
the conclusion. Reverse engineering victory may mitigate the effects of overconfidence
and skepticism toward nation-building, encourage creative thinking, and reveal
unexpected opportunities and challenges.

The American Way of Battle

Washington has repeatedly failed to prepare effectively for the endgame of war. Bradford
Lee examined U.S. war termination from World War I through the first Gulf War and
found that Washington: “had considerable difficulty in bringing political rationality and
military creativity to bear upon the strategic logic of war termination.”ix
Part of the problem is that U.S. military planning tends to neglect ultimate
political goals. According to Russell Weigley, the American way of war is more a way of
battle, which focuses on winning engagements, rather than turning military success into
strategic success.x Frederick Kagan described the American vision of war as a “target set”
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that ignores, “how, exactly, one defeats the enemy and what the enemy’s country looks
like at the moment the bullets stop flying.”xi
The United States also fails to plan adequately for scenarios of failure. When
conflict looms, American officials avoid being distracted by painful “what if” scenarios.
What if an insurgency emerges? Instead, Washington adopts a tunnel vision focus on
implementing the first moves in its chosen strategy for victory.
These problems are evident with U.S. war games. Following American airstrikes
against Iraq in 1998, the prospect of an ultimate showdown with Saddam Hussein loomed
closer. But General Anthony Zinni, the head of U.S. Central Command, saw a problem.
“It struck me then that we had a plan to defeat Saddam’s army, but we didn’t have a plan
to rebuild Iraq.” In 1999, Zinni organized a war game called “Desert Crossing” to
examine the contours of a post-Saddam Iraq. The exercise predicted a host of problems in
stabilizing the country, including “rival forces bidding for power,” fragmentation “along
religious and/or ethnic lines,” and an upsurge in “Iran’s anti-Americanism.”xii
Zinni asked different parts of the U.S. government, including the State
Department and the Department of Commerce, to help prepare for the stabilization of
Iraq. As Zinni recalled, the answer was: “Not interested. Would not look at it.”xiii A few
years later, when war loomed with Iraq, Zinni, who was now retired, called U.S. Central
Command. “You need to dust off Desert Crossing.” The reply was: “What’s that? Never
heard of it.” In just a few years the corporate memory “was gone.”xiv
Instead, war games during the Bush administration tended to neglect the
endgame. In 2002, the U.S. military carried out simulated regime change missions against
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a fictional country called Nair (which combined features of Iran and Iraq). Comfortingly,
the games ended in a decisive U.S. victory.
But according to one of the participants, Huba Wass de Czege, a retired brigadier
general, the simulations were based on a flawed conception of victory. They ended after
the United States achieved initial battlefield success rather than when Washington
attained its political goals. The exercises: “tend to devote more attention to successful
campaign-beginnings than to successful conclusions.” They finish when American
control of strategic locations looks like “a matter of time,” or in other words, when
“victory seems inevitable to us (not necessarily to the enemy).” The result is a “blind spot
at the back-end of campaigns.” xv
American war games also tend to neglect scenarios of military failure. A review
of education in the U.S. Army in 1971, for example, found that war games and other
exercises were: “generally euphoric in nature—the U.S. Army always wins with relative
ease.”xvi More recently, Wass de Czege wrote that in war games, “we greatly
underestimate the difficulty of concluding such campaigns promptly.” In reality,
“coalitions tend to fray as optimistic expectations fade and the achievement of strategic
aims is delayed…the enemy’s definition of winning promptly becomes not losing, or
delaying defeat until the coalition tires of pursuing its original strategic ends.”xvii
In the summer of 2002, the U.S. military played out a simulation called
Millennium Challenge. This was one of the largest war games in history: a massive $250
million exercise involving over 13,000 personnel, designed to test America’s capacity to
defeat a major country in the Middle East.
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Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper commanded the
enemy forces—and promptly employed asymmetric tactics to defeat the United States.
Van Riper sidestepped American electronic surveillance by delivering orders via
motorcycle messenger. When a U.S. fleet gathered for the invasion, Van Riper struck
first with cruise missiles and a swarm of suicide bombers in speedboats that destroyed 16
U.S. warships.
At this point, the Pentagon had an opportunity to explore the consequences of
military failure by letting the simulation run its course. Instead, the game was suspended,
the American fleet “came back to life,” and new rules were introduced to ensure victory
for the United States. Van Riper was told to reveal the location of some of his units, and
turn off his air defenses so that American troops could land safely. Rather than continue
with this sham, Van Riper quit in protest. “It was in actuality an exercise that was almost
entirely scripted to ensure [an American] ‘win.’”xviii
The failure to plan effectively for endgames soon became evident in practice as
well as in theory. An Army review criticized the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan: “The
lack of a war plan or theater campaign plan has hindered operations and led to a tactical
focus that ignores long-term objectives.”xix Thomas Pickering, the former undersecretary
of state for political affairs, told me that in Afghanistan: “We had a failure to define with
precision and clarity what our objectives are. The danger is not knowing where we want
to go, and seeking to achieve much more than we can possibly achieve.” xx Isaiah Wilson
described a “battle victory” in Afghanistan followed by “strategic stalemate.” xxi
The negative consequences of poor planning were even greater in Iraq.
Preparations for the Iraq War prioritized the regime change phase and neglected the
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subsequent effort to stabilize the country. The official U.S. Army history of the campaign
concluded: “it is questionable whether…[U.S. officials]…conducted a thorough,
coordinated, and realistic evaluation of the probable force levels required for Phase IV
based on the realities of the new Iraq that were emerging in front of them.”xxii
During 2002-2003, there was considerable interagency debate in Washington
about the government structure of post-war Iraq, involving the State Department, the
Defense Department, and U.S. Central Command—particularly at the level of the deputy
secretaries. The United States also prepared carefully for the early rounds of the Iraq
War, and even readied for negative scenarios that never actually happened, such as a
massive humanitarian crisis.xxiii
But a series of connected problems emerged in planning for post-Saddam Iraq that
proved highly damaging to U.S. interests. First, the final plan for Phase IV in Iraq was
decided very late in the process. Bush’s initial major briefing on post-conflict issues was
in January 2003, just weeks before the U.S. invasion in March. xxiv During the same
month of January 2003, retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was approached to
head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), or the post-war
Iraqi administration. Garner described his organization as being “glued together over
about four or five weeks time. [We] really didn’t have enough time to plan.”xxv
In early March, the policy for post-war government in Iraq was finally agreed.
Washington rejected the idea of creating a provisional government of Iraqi exiles, fearing
this would hand over too much power to untested individuals. Instead, U.S. officials
endorsed an “Iraqi Interim Authority,” which would relinquish a degree of sovereignty to
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Iraqis immediately, and then steadily transfer additional authority. By this point,
however, the war had almost begun.xxvi
Second, the civilian and military principals gave far less priority to the post-war
phase than more immediate concerns, such as pre-war diplomacy at the United Nations,
and the opening military rounds. According to Isaiah Wilson, the plan was “resourced
and directed toward the attainment of a limited military object (toppling of Saddam)
instead of a more comprehensive political object. We essentially planned our way into a
fight with Saddam instead of planning a way toward a better state of peace with the Iraqi
people.” xxvii
Tommy Franks, the head of U.S. Central Command, told the deputy secretary of
defense where his priorities lay: “You pay attention to the day after, I’ll pay attention to
the day of.”xxviii But civilian leaders also neglected the day after. Nine days before the war
began, Garner gave his only high-level briefing on post-war issues. Bush and senior
National Security Council officials seemed uninterested and asked no questions.xxix
On March 14, Rumsfeld told Garner: “I haven’t given you the time I should have
given you. Quite frankly, I just have been so engulfed in the war that I just didn’t have
time to focus on everything that you’re doing.”xxx Rumsfeld evidently saw Phase IV
stabilization operations as being quite distinct from “the war,” rather than something that
should be integrated into every stage of the military plan. Anthony Cordesman has
referred to this as the “rebuilding effort begins after the war ends syndrome.”xxxi
Third, the war plan was based on unrealistic assumptions and there was a lack of
contingency planning for scenarios of failure. Officials believed that security could be
quickly turned over to Iraqi police and army units, Iraqi oil revenues would cover most of
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the post-war costs, and U.S. force levels could draw down to around 30,000 by
September 2003—just four months after major combat operations ended. xxxii
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction concluded there was “no
established plans to manage the increasing chaos” in Iraq. As a result, “when Iraq’s
withering post-invasion reality superseded [official] expectations, there was no welldefined ‘Plan B’ as a fallback and no existing government structures or resources to
support a quick response.”xxxiii John Abizaid, the head of U.S. Central Command from
2003-2007, told me: “In Iraq we saw a lack of clarity on war ending conditions. There
was a heroic assumption that it would be quick and easy. The time horizon was not
extended far enough to cover the possibility of an insurgency.”xxxiv
Fourth, the plan was changed dramatically before it could even be implemented.
On May 6, 2003, Garner’s replacement, L. Paul Bremer, had a personal lunch with Bush,
where the president gave his envoy broad discretion about how to stabilize Iraq. Bremer
promptly abandoned the Iraqi Interim Authority, and turned the Coalition Provisional
Authority (successor to the ORHA) into a direct occupying power that would rule by
decree. The sudden abandonment of U.S. policy over lunch is testament to the lack of
forethought and coordination that went into preparation for the post-Saddam era.xxxv
The Iraq War was a well-orchestrated regime change mission followed by an
improvised stabilization operation. American troops were not trained to set up police and
judicial capabilities in Iraq or handle the wave of looting and violence that emerged.
Garner’s ORHA was under-resourced and quickly overwhelmed by mounting instability.
Bremer’s CPA was also hobbled by a lack of trained personnel and had limited reach

9

outside Baghdad. As the country unraveled, Washington achieved tactical success and
strategic defeat.xxxvi

The Fog of War

Why does the United States struggle at the endgame of war? Perhaps inattention to the
final stages of a campaign is simply a rational response to the fog of war. After all,
conflict is not a precise science like physics with fixed laws. It is more like an art, or a
social science based on probabilities. Military campaigns are inherently complex and
unpredictable, and there is usually doubt about the opponent’s capabilities and intentions.
Indeed, Leo Tolstoy saw history as “a succession of ‘accidents’ whose origins and
consequences are, by and large, untraceable and unpredictable.”xxxvii
Given this uncertainty, planning for the endgame of war could be an illusion.
History is littered with blueprints for victory that did not survive contact with the enemy.
Therefore, it may be reasonable to focus finite resources on the initial and relatively
predictable stages of war, and keep the nation’s options open for the “untraceable and
unpredictable” events to come. If decision-makers are not tied to a fixed plan, they can
see how the chips fall and adapt more easily to unexpected circumstances and the actions
of the other side. One military staff member that planned the invasion of Iraq concluded:
“both the planners and the commander had been schooled to see fighting as the realm of
war and thus attached lesser importance to post-war issues…Only a fool would propose
hurting the war fighting effort to address post-war conditions that might or might not
occur.”xxxviii
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But there is no convincing rational explanation for the U.S. failure to plan for
endgames. America’s experience in Afghanistan and Iraq—or indeed Japan’s experience
in World War II—suggest that inattention to the endgame starkly undermines state
interests. It is extremely difficult to improvise the final stages of war. National militaries
are large and unwieldy organizations that do not change course efficiently. The U.S.
military, for example, took years to adapt to the Iraqi insurgency.
Furthermore, post-war stabilization can be the most difficult phase of war and is
therefore worthy of additional attention, rather than neglect. Building a new political
order in Iraq was always likely to be more challenging than toppling Saddam’s sclerotic
regime. U.S. officials received—and largely ignored—many warnings about the probable
difficulties involved in owning Iraq, from organizations including the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army War College, the RAND
Corporation, and the United States Institute of Peace. One intelligence assessment in
January 2003, for example, claimed that Baathists: “could forge an alliance with existing
terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare against [Iraq’s] new
government or coalition forces.”xxxix
The fog of war hugely complicates planning for the endgame of conflict. But
countries do have some capacity to predict war outcomes and prepare ahead of time. If
they did not, the use of force would be fundamentally irrational.

In recent years,

Washington has not employed its available planning resources efficiently or effectively.
It is true that in certain campaigns, Washington has little time to plan ahead for
Phase IV. On September 10, 2001, few U.S. officials were focusing on Afghanistan.
Three months later, the United States owned the country. But there is no such excuse in
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the case of Iraq. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was a war of choice, and Washington
had plenty of time to prepare for Phase IV.
If we cannot understand Washington’s neglect of the endgame as a rational
response to the fog of war, what is the explanation? A variety of dynamics may play a
role in encouraging America’s short-term mindset. For example, debates over post-war
Iraq became bogged down in interagency divisions between the Department of State and
the Department of Defense.xl Furthermore, the Department of Defense ended up taking
the lead in planning for Phase IV but lacked the expertise and capabilities in many areas
of civilian reconstruction.xli Individual personalities may also have impeded long-term
strategic thinking. Tommy Franks, the head of Central Command, was largely
uninterested in the wider political goals of the war, and retired almost as soon as major
combat operations ended. According to one U.S. officer, Franks “really was comfortable
at the tactical level.”xlii
But these dynamics cannot explain a systemic failure to plan for endgames, or
account for why Washington prepared effectively for the initial steps in the Iraq War but
neglected the finale. A more fundamental answer lies with the interaction between two
variables: a psychological bias toward overconfidence, and a cultural and institutional
aversion to nation-building.

Overconfidence

The psychological bias of overconfidence can powerfully impede planning for the
endgame of war. Psychologists have found that mentally healthy people tend to
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exaggerate their perceived capabilities, overestimate their control over events, and exhibit
over-optimism about the future—features that are collectively labeled as positive
illusions or overconfidence. A survey of one million high school students, for example,
found that 70 percent rated themselves as above average in leadership ability. Similarly,
around 80 percent of people claim to be above average at driving. There is an extensive
literature on overconfidence, which covers a wide variety of subjects, issues, and
methodologies, and includes rating against objective benchmarks.xliii
Positive illusions can significantly heighten the risk of war. If leaders exaggerate
the odds of military success, they may be more enthusiastic about seizing the sword.
Geoffrey Blainey argued that overconfidence is “a potent and pervasive cause of war,”
while Stephen Van Evera found it “crucial to an understanding of war.”xliv
Overconfidence can also encourage poor planning for the military endgame. If
leaders assume the final stages of war will be easy, they may not pay as much attention to
the conclusion. Before the invasion of Iraq, for example, U.S officials exhibited
overconfidence about the post-war phase, including the ease of establishing security, the
degree of Iraqi popular support for the intervention, and the capacity of Iraq’s
government, police, and army to administer the country and provide law and order.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s comments in February 2003 symbolized
the administration’s mindset: “we’re not talking about the occupation of Iraq. We’re
talking about the liberation of Iraq…Therefore, when that regime is removed we will find
[the Iraqi people]…basically welcoming us as liberators.”xlv A RAND study in 2005
found that in pre-war planning: “post conflict stabilization and reconstruction were
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addressed only very generally, largely because of the prevailing view that the task would
not be difficult.”xlvi
Positive illusions are a general trait in human psychology, and are often evident
on the eve of war. As cultural historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch put it: “nations are as
incapable of imagining their own defeat as individuals are of conceiving their own
death.”xlvii But three sources of variation may heighten the odds that the United States
will be overconfident about the endgame of war.
First, overconfidence varies between cultures, and Americans may be particularly
prone to positive illusions about their abilities. Scholars suggest that self-enhancement of
individual capabilities is more acceptable and beneficial in the United States relative to
East Asia. Psychologists David Armor and Shelley Taylor wrote that: “Americans are
widely regarded as the most optimistic people on earth.”xlviii James Stavridis, the former
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, told me: “U.S. military culture is not particularly
compatible with failure planning.” One reason is, “the culture of ‘can-do,’ ‘we will
succeed,’ or as Colin Powell put it, ‘perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.’”xlix
Second, people may be more prone to overconfidence about the final stages of
war relative to the initial rounds. Construal level theory in psychology predicts that actors
judge immediate tasks based on their feasibility, whereas they judge distant endeavors
based on whether the goals are desirable. Future scenarios are more divorced from known
reality, and so people often rely on vague, abstract, or simplistic mental constructs—and
thereby fall prey to overconfidence. People ask fewer tough questions about distant
events and often see what they want to see. According to Aaron Rapport, “temporal
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distance encourages people to downplay or even ignore the feasibility of their long-term
objectives.”l
Applied to war planning, officials are predicted to consider near-term events in a
relatively cool-headed manner and the final stages of the campaign with a relatively
overconfident mindset. As expected, U.S. planning for the Iraq War was fairly cautious
about the regime change phase. Indeed, Washington prepared for a number of problems
that never transpired, such as a humanitarian crisis. But this wariness largely disappeared
when it came to thinking about post-war Iraq. According to the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction: “The U.S. government planned for the worst-case humanitarian
scenario while it simultaneously planned for the best-case reconstruction one.”li
Third, overconfidence is prone to spike at a particularly inopportune moment for
effective planning: when war is perceived as imminent. The Rubicon Model of Action
Phases in psychology suggests that decision-making follows a series of distinct stages,
each of which activates a particular mind-set, or cognitive orientation. A “deliberative”
mind-set dominates the predecisional phase, when different policy options are weighed
and compared. Here, actors judge issues fairly objectively in a bid to make the best
selection. An “implemental” mind-set dominates the postdecisional phase, when the
focus shifts to enacting the selected option. Actors in an implemental mind-set become
committed to the chosen course of action and exhibit heightened levels of
overconfidence. In the words of psychologists Heinz Heckhausen and Peter M.
Gollwitzer, people become “narrow-minded partisans of their plans of action.”lii
Decision-making about war is therefore expected to follow the same sequence.
When leaders believe a war is possible but not certain, they will weigh the potential
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outcomes in a relatively wary manner. At this stage, planners may pay attention to worstcase scenarios, and vigorously debate the merits of different military options. But when
war is seen as imminent, decision-makers will switch to an “implemental” mindset that
triggers a range of psychological biases, especially overconfidence. They will worry less
about the feasibility of the proposed strategy, and avoid making contingency plans for
possible failure. Instead, planners will become partisans of the chosen course of action,
and adopt a “tunnel vision” focus on taking the initial steps in the plan for victory.
Leaders may also be reluctant to prepare for a long struggle by stockpiling supplies or
restructuring the country economically. Given their implemental mind-set, there seems
less need to do so.liii
The switch to implemental mindsets may have influenced U.S. war plans. In
1999, when the prospects for an invasion of Iraq were uncertain, Zinni’s war game
examined the challenges of post-war stabilization in a cautious manner. Washington’s
1998 plan for the invasion of Iraq, OPLAN 1003-98, called for the use of 400,000 troops.
But in 2002, when conflict loomed much closer, U.S. war games exhibited
overconfidence about the campaign, and planners dramatically scaled down the size of
the invasion force.liv

Aversion to Nation-Building

A second dynamic inhibiting effective U.S. planning for the endgame of war is a cultural
aversion to nation-building. Wider American public opinion, political leaders, and the
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U.S. military, are all skeptical about using force for stabilization operations, including
counter-insurgency and peacekeeping.
Public approval for nation-building missions is consistently lower than for
interventions aimed at restraining the foreign policies of other states.lv Whereas
Americans tend to view conventional interstate wars like the world wars or the Gulf War
as righteous crusades, they see nation-building operations like Vietnam, Somalia, or Iraq
as grim quagmires.lvi
In part, public skepticism reflects Washington’s very real struggles at nationbuilding, for example, in Vietnam. But the public often disapproves of nation-building
even when the mission succeeds, like peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo in the
1990s.lvii Nation-building missions lack the “good versus evil” moral clarity of interstate
war. They dredge up painful memories of Vietnam. Americans on the left sometimes see
nation-building as a dangerous form of imperialism. Meanwhile, Americans on the right
often view nation-building as a nefarious kind of big government social engineering.lviii
The U.S. military also traditionally favors conventional interstate war over nationbuilding. Russell Weigley wrote that Washington has repeatedly engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns but each time it “had to relearn appropriate tactics at exorbitant
costs,” and viewed the experience “as an aberration that need not be repeated.” lix
Following Vietnam, the U.S. Army decided it would never fight guerrillas again, and
actually destroyed its notes on counter-insurgency. Instead, officials planned incessantly
for an interstate showdown against the Soviet Union in Europe. After the Cold War
ended, the U.S. military continued to neglect nation-building and counter-insurgency.
Stabilization missions were dismissed as “military operations other than war,” or
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Mootwa. The chairman of the joint chiefs reportedly said: “Real men don’t do
Mootwa.”lx
In 2007, Robert Gates, the secretary of defense, said that after Vietnam, “the
Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine, and budget
priorities.” As a result, “it left the services unprepared to deal with the operations that
followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq—the
consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today.”lxi
This aversion to nation-building can impede effective planning for the endgame
of war. The desire to avoid stabilization operations may promote the vision of war as a
target-set designed to eliminate enemy forces, rather than create the conditions for
ultimate political success. And having neglected training at post-conflict operations, and
failed to learn the lessons of past counter-insurgency missions, the U.S. military is less
able to prepare for the consequences of regime change.
The George W. Bush administration, for example, came into office belittling
nation-building as armed social work and Clinton-style do-goodery. “Let me tell you
what else I’m worried about,” said Bush the day before the 2000 election. “I’m worried
about an opponent who uses ‘nation-building’ and ‘the military’ in the same sentence.”lxii
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that U.S. nation-building missions, like
in the Balkans, created a culture of foreign dependence. Instead, he advocated a model of
U.S. military “transformation” based on agile high-technology warfare and “small
footprint” regime change operations.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration’s aversion to nationbuilding undermined planning for the endgame by encouraging the belief that extensive
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stabilization operations would be imprudent and unnecessary. After overthrowing the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the United States resisted anything that resembled nationbuilding. In 2002, there were only 10,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, along with 5,000
international troops, in a country of 30 million people. As a result, Washington failed to
create an effective government in Kabul and allowed the Taliban to recover.lxiii
Similarly, American skepticism about nation-building in Iraq was a major barrier
to achieving long-term political goals. Bush sought to remove Saddam without getting
bogged down in a drawn-out stabilization operation. Rumsfeld consistently pressed for
reducing U.S. troop levels and handing responsibility over to the Iraqis. “If you’re not
willing to take your hand off the bicycle seat, the person will never learn to ride.”lxiv
The U.S. military’s aversion to nation-building may also have eroded effective
planning in Iraq. According to Conrad Crane, “the U.S. military would rather not deal
with [stabilization operations] or would like to quickly hand them off to other U.S.
Government agencies or international organizations.” lxv Tommy Franks, the head of U.S.
Central Command, was scornful about the task of post-war stabilization in Iraq. In April
2003, the military needed a name for the new “combined joint task force” that would
oversee the stabilization of the country. Franks suggested: “CJTF-1369, unlucky
cocksuckers.”lxvi

Optimism and Skepticism

The interaction between a positivity bias (overconfidence) and a negativity bias (the
aversion to nation-building) may play a crucial role in explaining America’s inadequate
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planning for endgames. An exaggerated belief in success combined with an allergy to
stabilization operations encourages the vision of war as liberation, where Phase IV
operations will be relatively straightforward, the target population yearns to be free, and
any prolonged U.S. presence is detrimental. In effect, skepticism about nation-building
channels overconfidence by promoting the belief that post-war stabilization can somehow
be circumvented. Officials therefore decline to ask tough questions, explore the
requirements of nation-building in detail, or consider how to handle negative scenarios
including sectarian tensions or a potential insurgency.
If either of these two dynamics were missing, the same pattern of ineffective
planning for the endgame might not be evident. If overconfidence were present but there
was no aversion to nation-building, positive illusions might have manifested themselves
in different ways, for example, by encouraging the belief that a large footprint nationbuilding mission would succeed. Alternatively, if skepticism about stabilization
operations were present but there was no overconfidence, Washington might have been
deterred from invading Iraq for fear of getting bogged down in a protracted nationbuilding operation.
The synergy between overconfidence and skepticism about stabilization
operations led U.S. officials to conclude they could achieve the best of all worlds: regime
change and the democratization of Iraq, without tying down American troops in
prolonged nation-building. As Thomas Pickering told me, the White House believed that:
“military victory would produce its own rewards magically out of the clouds.” lxvii

Reverse Engineering Victory
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There is no simple solution for a problem caused by deep-rooted psychological and
cultural factors. Instead, a number of complementary approaches can be tried.
Washington, for example, could set up institutional structures that encourage critical
debate about the endgame of war such as creating a formal devil’s advocate, or a senior
official tasked with criticizing the proposed strategy, and ensuring a wider range of
perspectives reach the president’s ear.lxviii In addition, Washington could also try to plan
for conflict ahead of time, before entering the danger zone of implemental mind-sets
where overconfident biases are likely to contaminate decisionmaking.
Furthermore, James Stavridis told me: “we should do more deliberate planning for
potential failure,” by systematically studying past debacles.lxix This advice echoes the
review of Army education in 1971: “A strong element of every curriculum should be
historical

studies

which

frankly

analyze

unsuccessful

American

military

efforts…[including]…an objective discussion of what we did, what went wrong, and
why. This single action would do more to establish credibility for our instruction than any
other known to me.” lxx
Washington also needs to think more creatively about the endgame. The
traditional way to plan for endgames is to engineer victory by identifying national goals
and then creating a roadmap that works toward this end state. In a regime change
mission, for example, officials can move progressively from Phase I through Phase IV.
An alternative approach is to reverse engineer victory, by working backward from
the Phase IV stabilization phase. The chess grandmaster José Raúl Capablanca once said:
“In order to improve your game, you must study the endgame before everything else. For
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whereas the endings can be studied and mastered by themselves, the middle game and the
opening must be studied in relation to the endgame.”lxxi Capablanca’s strategy was to
work backward from success, and then secure a small positional edge early on—say,
three pawns to two on one side of the board—which ultimately proved decisive.
Working backward from success is an established idea in other domains as well.
For example, one of the principles of game theory is “backward induction” or starting out
with the final move, then looking at the next-to-last decision, and so on, before finally
discovering what you should do at the beginning. Knowing how the final round will play
out determines the optimal initial choice. Similarly, before building a house, people
create a blueprint. They start at the end by imagining the completed structure, and then
work backward from the final stage.
War, of course, is a very different domain than chess, simple game theoretic
models, or construction. But the same core advice holds true: the opening and the middle
stages of a military campaign should be studied in relation to the endgame. Several
scholars have briefly noted the potential of working backward in wartime planning. A
RAND analysis of the Iraq War suggested, in passing: “Planners must start with strategic
guidance from the civilian leadership on where they want to be, strategically, when the
war ends. They can then work backward to points of major conflict, shaping plans for
those in ways that contribute to the larger and longer-term strategic goal.”lxxii Gideon
Rose also noted in passing that instead of thinking forward from Phase I through Phase
IV, we should “reverse the direction of the sequence.” According to Rose: “This easy fix
would focus attention on the desired end result as the starting point for all war planning,
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with the earlier stages understood as having significance only as building blocks of or
preparatory stages for the final outcome.”lxxiii
Although not quite an “easy fix,” reverse engineering victory holds considerable
promise as a tool of military planning. What would this process look like? Planners
should first visualize the desired end state in as much detail as possible. What is
America’s geographic area of control? What does the target country’s political system
and economy look like? What is the timeframe for achieving these goals? Before
invading Iraq, for example, Washington might have outlined a plausible conception of the
country as a reasonably democratic and stable ally by, say, 2006.
Planner can then work backward from this future vision. What is the final step
before reaching the end state? What is the second to last step? What will be required one
month before the target date? How about six months or one year? This path can be
broken down into short-term actions and milestones. Washington, for example, could
have worked backward from a stable Iraq in 2006 through the intermediate stages, such
as overseeing elections, creating effective security forces, and so on—always specifying
which American assets must be in place at each point in time and how they should be
used.
Reverse engineering victory requires asking many of the same questions as a
traditional forward-looking plan. What are the respective strengths of the combatants?
What is each side’s potential for mobilizing resources? What role will external actors
play?
The vision of a path back from the end state is a creative thought exercise rather
than a precise route to be followed. Washington cannot script the entire campaign, or
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follow the proposed course precisely. Intelligence about the target country may be
limited. The fog of war, unexpected events, and the enemy’s response all create added
uncertainty. And each side’s objectives often change during the fighting according to the
fortunes of war.
But the exercise of reverse engineering victory offers several valuable benefits.
First, it encourages planners to focus on the ultimate political objective. Strategy is about
efficiently working toward clear goals, or in other words, knowing the destination before
starting the journey. With traditional attempts to engineer victory, today’s world is cast in
bright lights whereas the end state is usually murky. Planners are therefore tempted to
prioritize the initial steps we can clearly identify and hope everything works out in the
end. By contrast, starting at the end encourages officials to illuminate the finale by
imagining this outcome in detail. Reverse engineering victory is therefore an antidote to
short-termism. It habituates planners to think about ultimate strategic success and not just
about prevailing in individual battles.
For example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the central goal from the start should
have been the broader aim of creating reasonably stable and representative regimes. If
this had been the focus from day one, the Bush administration might have provided
additional resources for post-war stabilization or even avoided the war in Iraq altogether.
Second, reverse engineering victory can mitigate the effects of overconfidence.
The exercise provides a reality check by encouraging planners to think more critically
about the feasibility of their objectives and the concrete steps necessary to get there. As
we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan, post-war stabilization may be the most difficult phase of

24

a campaign. Placing the greatest barriers to success center stage could reduce the odds of
positive illusions.
Furthermore, construal level theory predicts that people create a mental construct
of the future based on wishful thinking rather than realistic prospects for success. Reverse
engineering victory may reduce this effect by encouraging actors to map out this mental
construct in greater detail, thereby contextualizing the endgame, and making it less vague
and abstract. The exercise may also help guard against the negative effects of
implemental mindsets by preventing actors from simply ignoring questions of how
ultimate success will be achieved.
Third, reverse engineering victory can alleviate problems caused by an aversion to
nation-building. The exercise encourages planners to think carefully about what is truly
required for post-war stabilization. For example, working backward might have produced
more detailed and precise thinking about the nature of the post-Saddam government.
The whole notion of “Phase IV” promotes the idea that stabilization efforts are a
distinct and secondary endeavor that occurs after the main fight is complete. Efforts to
create order and governance, however, should begin as soon as the first shot is fired.
Douglas Feith, who was undersecretary of defense for policy at the time of the Iraq
invasion, recognized a “major error” in that “across the board, administration officials
thought that postwar reconstruction would take place post—that is, after—the war.”lxxiv
Reverse engineering victory can limit this problem by promoting the perception
of war fighting and stabilization as intertwined activities. By working backwards,
planners may recognize that major combat operations are a building block to achieve
ultimate political goals. Phase III (major combat operations) is viewed, not as a successor
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to Phase II (initial operations to seize the initiative), but in terms of how it facilitates
Phase IV (post-combat stabilization).
Fourth, the exercise may reveal unexpected obstacles, challenges, or
opportunities. Working backward may show that certain steps in the plan are fairly
straightforward to map out, for example, a plausible timetable for elections during the
stabilization phase. If a representative regime is in place in Baghdad in 2006, we need
national elections in 2005. But other aspects of the plan may be extremely hard to project
with any confidence, such as building regional political support for the new government.
These uncertainties should then be factored into the decision whether or not to wage war.
Reverse engineering victory may also indicate that a seemingly inconsequential
move early in the campaign could turn out to be critical later on. For example, by
working backward from a representative regime in Iraq, we may find that allying with a
minor local leader in the immediate aftermath of regime change will ultimately reap a
dividend as the political arena opens up.
How speculative is this exercise? The proposed path backward will be more or
less tentative depending on the length, complexity, and difficulty of the military
campaign. In a fairly straightforward operation, officials may be able to follow the broad
contours of the proposed roadmap with some confidence. The United States typically
outmatches its opponents in military power and can often expect the opening rounds of
conflict to go relatively smoothly. When fighting more powerful opponents, or in
conflicts involving extensive post-war stabilization, the steps will be more problematic to
map out precisely. But here the exercise remains extremely important—indeed it may be
more important—in terms of identifying potential challenges and uncertainties.
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Engineering victory and reverse engineering victory are complimentary tools. We
can end up with two paths: from the origin to the destination, and from the destination to
the origin. Comparing and integrating the two routes may reveal the optimum course.
Washington may even use the “red team, blue team” approach by setting up independent
groups to think forward to victory, and backward from victory. Once the two paths are
created they can then be integrated into the final war plan.

Conclusion

Despite its vast intelligence and military resources, the United States has struggled to
master the endgame of war. The psychological bias of overconfidence and an aversion to
nation-building have combined to promote a short-term mentality that downplays
preparations for the finale of conflict. This combination of beliefs is likely to shape future
military campaigns. Positive illusions are an integral part of human psychology, and may
be particularly prominent among Americans. The aversion to nation-building is also
deeply embedded in broader American culture, and is evident today with the Barack
Obama administration. In 2012, the Pentagon announced: “U.S. forces will no longer be
sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”lxxv Obama’s famous “pivot”
from the Middle East to the Pacific is really a turn from nation-building in places like
Iraq, toward interstate rivalry against opponents like China and North Korea.
One solution is to reverse engineer victory, by identifying the conditions for
ultimate political success and then working backward from the end state. This exercise
forces planners to look at the military campaign from a new angle. It encourages officials
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to ask difficult questions, and spurs imaginative thinking. It also provides a test of the
proposed use of force. If the process of creating a plausible path from the end state is too
difficult we may need to rethink the whole endeavor.
Of course, reverse engineering victory could itself succumb to the biases of
overconfidence and an aversion to nation-building. But the exercise may be less prone to
these problems than alternative planning tools. Starting at the end places the stabilization
phase front and center, and encourages greater consideration of what is truly required in
terms of nation-building.
The answer is not to embrace rigid long-term thinking. Attempting to follow a
fixed path to victory regardless of the changing environment will invite disaster. War is a
collision between opposing forces not an engineering project. The military policy will
need to be adapted as conditions change. The path backward will not be the war plan, but
it can inform the war plan. By balancing long-term planning with short-term flexibility,
the United States can avoid leaping in the dark.
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